Abstract: In this paper we develop an innovative computable general equilibrium model with foreign direct investment that allows us to assess preferential trade agreements that include commitments to multinational investors in services. The model, which we apply to Kenya, contains Dixit-Stiglitz productivity effects from additional varieties of imperfectly competitive goods or services. To assess the sensitivity of the results to parameter values, the model is executed 30,000 times, and results are reported as confidence intervals of the sample distributions. Our central estimate for Kenya regarding a preferential arrangement with the Africa region that includes services commitments is that it will obtain very small gains; but there is a two percent chance Kenya would lose from the agreement. These possible losses show that there is an imperfect competition analogy to trade diversion in goods, whereby preferential commitments in services could be immizerising. Further sensitivity analysis shows that losses are more likely the more technologically advanced are the excluded regions relative to the partner region, and the greater the rent capture on initial barriers in services. Estimated gains for a similar agreement with the European Union are two to three times larger, and these occur with probability one. Multilateral liberalization would yield gains five times greater than a preferential agreement with the European Union, but the largest estimated gains derive from removal of regulatory barriers that impose costs on Kenyan as well as multinational service providers.
Estimated gains for an agreement with the African region are very small, but a similar agreement with the European Union is estimated to yield gains that are two to three times larger. Multilateral liberalization would yield gains five times greater than a preferential agreement with the European Union, but the largest estimated gains derive from removal of regulatory barriers that impose costs on Kenyan as well as multinational service providers.
To assess the robustness of the results to parameter uncertainty, we conduct systematic sensitivity analysis, where we execute the model 30,000 times, where each simulation is based on a random draw of all the parameter values, including the share of rents captured by Kenyan agents. We then present the key results as sample distributions and sample confidence intervals. We estimate that Kenya would realize gains from an agreement with the European Union with a probability of one, but there is a 1.9 percent chance that Kenya would lose from a preferential arrangement with the Africa region.
Preferential liberalization of services barriers results in an increase in varieties for regional partners, but losses of varieties from excluded countries. The possible losses for Kenya in a services agreement with our Africa region show that there is an imperfect competition analogy to trade diversion in goods whereby preferential commitments in services could be immizerising due to a loss of varieties of services from excluded countries.
We conduct piecemeal sensitivity of the results, where we isolate the impact of each of the parameters to ascertain which parameters most strongly impact the results. We show that the parameter that captures the capacity of a region to transfer technology to Kenya is quite important in explaining why an agreement with the technologically advanced region (the EU) is worth about twice as much to Kenya as an agreement with the developing country region.
It is well known that preferential liberalization of goods can lead to welfare losses, due to the loss of tariff revenue on diverted trade from excluded partners. While there are no tariffs on FDI in services, if the home country captures rents from regulatory barriers, they play an analogous role as tariffs in service liberalization. If Kenyans are assumed to capture the rents from barriers in services, then, even in a constant returns to scale version of our model, the mean estimate from is that Kenya would lose.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide an overview of the Kenyan services sectors. We discuss how we estimated the tariff equivalents of the barriers in services in section III. We provide an overview of the model in section IV and a discussion of the data in section V. The central results are presented in section VI and sensitivity results are presented in section VII. Conclusions are presented in section VIII.
II. Overview of the Kenyan Service Sectors
In this section, we briefly summarize the key institutional and policy issues in telecommunications, banking, insurance and transportation. This discussion is based on several policy notes written on the Kenyan business services sectors, which are summarized in more detail in Balistreri and Tarr (2011) .
Transportation
One bright spot in the Kenyan transportation network is its air transportation services. In recent years, Kenya allowed private sector development (both Kenyan and foreign) to develop the air transportation links. The efficient air transportation services facilitate the important tourism sector and have been instrumental in the development of the Kenyan cut flower industry, which in turn has contributed to growth and poverty reduction.
However, Kenya's port, rail and road transportation facilities are plagued by significant bureaucratic, regulatory as well as investment problems-problems that raise the costs of transportation of its goods. On the international Logistics Perception Index of 2004, 4 Kenya was ranked as the least logistically friendly of the 70 countries (World Bank, 2007) . For 2010, the survey expanded to include 155 countries, and Kenya ranked at number 99. In Africa, Kenya ranked number 11 out of 36 sub-Saharan countries.
Telecommunications
Kenya's telecommunications services have been expensive compared with other sub-Saharan African countries and even more when compared with those of East and South Asia. Data transmissions are especially expensive by international standards. 5 Perhaps more important, is the low efficiency of service provision (see World Bank, 2007, pp.45-47) . Kenya has required that telephone companies must be at least 30 percent owned by Kenyan nationals. Problems related to the licensing off the third mobile telephone provider and the -Second National Operator‖ were primarily due to this restraint. In fact, the Government has acknowledged that the 30 percent ownership requirement has delayed licensing of additional telecom operators.
Banking and Insurance
Relative to other countries in Africa, Kenya has a well developed financial sector. Nonetheless, medium, small and micro enterprises have severe problems accessing credit and obtaining insurance (World Bank, 2007) . In practice, affiliates of multinational banks are provided full market access and national treatment, but Kenya has not -bound‖ this practice at the WTO. The European Union has requested that Kenya commit to national treatment of foreign investment in the sector by binding this commitment at the WTO (Kiptui, 2007) . Branch banking by foreign banks, however, is not permitted.
Regarding the regulatory environment in insurance, cross border provision of insurance is limited to cargo insurance and reinsurance services. In addition, the ownership of an insurance company must be at least one-third Kenyan and one-third of the members of the Boards of Directors must be Kenyan.
Professional Services
There are rather severe restrictions on the rights of foreigners to operate with a license in many of the professional services sectors, including legal, accounting, auditing and engineering services. The East African Customs Union is making its first foray into commitments in the services areas by encouraging mutual recognition agreements among the members. In appendix D, we provide details on the situation in engineering services sectors.
III. Estimation of the Ad Valorem Equivalence of the Regulatory Barriers
We first commissioned a 54 page survey of the regulatory regimes in key Kenyan business services sectors, namely, insurance, banking, fixed line and mobile telecommunications services and maritime transportation services. 6 We supplemented this information based on Kiptui (2007) and several other good studies on the services sectors that were presented at the conference on -Trade in Services‖ in Nairobi, Kenya on March 26-27, 2007 . The study by the World Bank (2007) provided additional detail on the key issues in the telecommunications and transportation sectors These questionnaires and papers provided us with data and descriptions and assessments of the regulatory environment in these sectors. Mircheva (2007) then estimated the ad valorem equivalents of barriers to foreign direct investment in fixed line and mobile telecommunications, banking, insurance and maritime transportation services. The process involved converting the answers and data of the questionnaires into an index of restrictiveness in each industry. Mircheva followed the methodology of Kimura, Ando and Fujii (2004a , 2004b , 2004c to generate these estimates. In the case of professional services, based on a separate survey, we used engineering services as a proxy for all professional services. 7 The details of the regulatory regime and the scoring are explained in appendix D of Balistreri and Tarr (2011) .
This methodology further involves building on the estimates and methodology of several researchers who published the research in the volume by C. Findlay and T. Warren (2000) , notably papers by Warren (2000) in telecom, McGuire and Schulele (2000) in financial services and Kang (2000) in transportation. For each of these service sectors, the authors evaluated the regulatory environment across many countries. The price of services is then regressed against the regulatory barriers to determine the impact of any of the regulatory barriers on the price of services. Mircheva (and Kweka in the case of engineering services) then assumed that the international regression applies to Kenya in the case that the above mentioned restrictiveness indexes are used. Applying that regression and their assessments of the regulatory environment in Kenya from the questionnaires and other information sources, she estimated the ad valorem impact of a reduction in barriers 8 both for discriminatory and non-discriminatory barriers.
Mircheva then weighted her fixed line and mobile telecommunications estimates by their market shares to obtain her estimate for communications. The results of the estimates of the ad valorem equivalents of the barriers are listed in table 1.
In the case of professional services, we used engineering services as a proxy for all professional services. In engineering services, we have the regression results from the paper by Ngyuen-Hong (2000) .
Based on an international data set, he estimates the ad valorem equivalents of barriers on trade in engineering services. No such estimates are available for other professional services. Since the methodology we employ requires the existence of a cross-country regression estimate of the impact of barriers to foreign direct investment, we must use engineering services as our proxy. The details of the regulatory regime and the scoring are listed as appendix D of Balistreri and Tarr (2011) .
IV. Overview of the Model
A full algebraic description of the model may be found in Balistreri and Tarr (2011, appendix F) .
Here we provide a general description of the structure while focusing on the extensions to a model that can address preferential liberalization. There are 55 sectors in the model shown in table 1. Primary factors include skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labor; mobile capital; sector-specific capital in imperfectly competitive sectors; and primary inputs imported by multinational service providers, reflecting specialized management expertise or technology of the firm. The existence of sector specific capital in several sectors implies that there are decreasing returns to scale in the use of the mobile factors and supply curves in these sectors slope up. This is explained algebraically in appendix G of Balistreri and Tarr (2011) .
There are three categories of firms in the model: (1) perfectly competitive goods and services sectors: (2) imperfectly competitive goods sectors; and (3) imperfectly competitive services sectors with foreign direct investment. The cost, production and pricing structures in the three categories differ widely.
The principal extension from earlier work of Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) is that we disaggregate the rest of the world region into three regions: (1) the European Union; (2) the union of the 8 Warren estimated quantity impacts and then using elasticity estimates was able to obtain price impacts. The estimates by Mircheva that we employ are for -discriminatory‖ barriers against foreign direct investment.
East African Customs Union and COMESA, which we call our African region; and (3) 
Goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale
Goods in these seven sectors are differentiated at the firm level. We assume that manufactured goods may be produced domestically or imported for firms in any region in the model. Firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which does not vary with output) equals marginal revenue;
and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero. For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed primary factor and intermediate inputs to that sector in the base year data. Foreigners produce the goods abroad at constant marginal cost but incur a fixed cost of operating in Kenya. The cif import price of foreign goods is simply defined by the import price, and, by the zero profits assumption, in equilibrium the import price must cover fixed and marginal costs of foreign firms. Domestic firms set prices using the Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which results in constant markups over marginal cost for both foreign firms and domestic firms.
We have made one significant modeling extension in the imperfectly competitive sectors compared to the Balistreri, Rutherford and Tarr (2009) For simplicity we assume that the composition of fixed and marginal cost is identical in all firms producing under increasing returns to scale (in both goods and services). This assumption in a our DixitStiglitz based Chamberlinian large-group model assures that output per firm for all firm types remains constant, i.e., the model does not produce rationalization gains or losses.
The number of varieties affects the productivity of the use of imperfectly competitive goods based on the standard Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. The effective cost function for users of goods produced subject to increasing returns to scale declines in the total number of firms in the industry.
Service sectors that are produced under increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition
These nine sectors are telecommunications, banking and insurance services, various transportation services and professional business services. In these services sectors, we observe that some services are provided by foreign service providers on a cross border basis analogous to goods providers from abroad. But a large share of business services are provided by service providers with a domestic presence, both multinational and Kenyan. 9 Our model allows for both types of foreign service provision in these sectors. There are cross border services allowed in this sector and they are provided from abroad at constant costs-this is analogous to competitive provision of goods from abroad. Cross border services, however, are not good substitutes for service providers who have a domestic presence.
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Crucial to the results, we allow multinational service firm providers that choose to establish a presence in Kenya in order to compete with Kenyan firms directly. As in the goods sectors, services that are produced subject to increasing returns to scale are differentiated at the firm level. Firms in these industries set prices such that marginal cost (which is constant) equals marginal revenue; and there is free entry, which drives profits to zero. We assume firm level product differentiation and employ the Chamberlinian large group monopolistic competition assumption within a Dixit-Stiglitz framework.
Given our assumption on the composition of fixed and variable costs, we have constant markups over marginal cost for both foreign firms and domestic firms, i.e., no rationalization impacts.
For domestic firms, costs are defined by observed primary factors and intermediate inputs to that sector in the base year data. When multinationals service providers decide to establish a presence in Kenya, they will import some of their technology or management expertise. That is, foreign direct investment generally entails importing specialized foreign inputs. Thus, the cost structure of multinationals differs from national only service providers. Multinationals incur costs related to both imported primary inputs and Kenyan primary factors, in addition to intermediate factor inputs. Foreign provision of services differs from foreign provision of goods, since the service providers use Kenyan primary inputs. Domestic service providers do not import the specialized primary factors available to the multinationals. Hence, domestic service firms incur primary factor costs related to Kenyan labor and capital only. These services are characterized by firm-level product differentiation. For multinational firms, the barriers to foreign direct investment affect their profitability and entry. Reduction in the constraints on foreign direct investment will induce foreign entry that will typically lead to productivity gains because when more varieties of service providers are available, buyers can obtain varieties that more closely fit their demands and needs (the Dixit-Stiglitz variety effect).
Evidence on the role of trade and FDI in increasing total factor productivity through technology transfer 11 Winters et al. (2004, 84) summarize the empirical literature by concluding that -the recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that openness and trade liberalization have a strong influence on productivity and its rate of change.‖ Beginning with the path-breaking work of Coe and Helpman (1995) , a rich literature exists that shows that the purchase of intermediate inputs is an important mechanism for the transmission of knowledge and the increase in total factor productivity growth in developing countries, and that for small countries, especially developing countries this mechanism is crucial.
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Regarding the impact of FDI on the productivity of firms, the results depend on intra-industry versus inter-industry impacts. Since FDI in the same industry may bring spillovers, but has an adverse competitive or market share impact, the literature has found mixed results on the productivity of firms in the same industry that receives the FDI. But several papers have found significant productivity spillovers from FDI in both upstream (supplying) industries and downstream (using) industries. Saggi (2006) summarizes the theory and empirical papers that show the spillovers of FDI on supplying industries.
Regarding the productivity impacts specifically from FDI in services, we have summarized the literature in the first section.
In our model, it is the greater availability of varieties that is the engine of productivity growth, but we believe there are other mechanisms as well through which trade may increase productivity.
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Consequently, we take variety as a proxy for the various ways increased trade can increase productivity.
A key article on the role of product variety is Broda and Weinstein (2004) , which found that increased product variety contributes to a fall of 1.2 percent per year in the -true‖ import price index. Hummels and 11 See for details and references to additional empirical studies in this subsection.
12 Schiff et al., (2002, table 1) have shown that for R&D intensive sectors, trade with industrialized countries contributes significantly to total factor productivity in developing countries, but trade with developing countries does not. On the other hand, for sectors that are low in R&D intensity, their results suggest that for technology diffusion trade with developing countries can be as important as trade with industrialized countries. 13 Trade or services liberalization may increase growth indirectly through its positive impact on the development of institutions (see Rodrik, Subramananian and Trebbi, 2004) . It may also induce firms to move down their average cost curves, or import higher quality products or shift production to more efficient firms within an industry. Tybout and Westbrook (1995) find evidence of this latter type of rationalization for Mexican manufacturing firms.
Klenow (2005) and Schott (2004) have shown that product variety and quality are important in explaining trade between nations. Feenstra et al. (1999) show that increased variety of exports in a sector increases total factor productivity in most manufacturing sectors in Taiwan (China) and Korea, and they have some evidence that increased input variety also increases total factor productivity. In business services, because of the high cost of using distant suppliers, the close availability of a diverse set of business services may be even more important for growth than in goods. The evidence for this was cited in the introduction section.
In our model, the parameter that reflects the ability of a region to increase total factor productivity through the transmission of new technologies is the elasticity of firm supply with respect to the price.
The primitive for this elasticity in our model is the share of sector specific capital associated with the production of a firm type in a sector. As explained in Balistreri and Tarr (2011, appendix F) , given an elasticity of firm supply and the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity of substitution, we solve for the share of sector specific capital consistent with these elasticities. Based on the literature summary in Jensen and Tarr (2010, Appendix E), we assign central values to the elasticities of firm supply based on the region and the research and development intensity of the sector. The assigned central values for these parameters by sector and region are in table 2. We conduct extensive sensitivity analysis on this parameter, both piecemeal and systematic.
V. Data of the Model

Social Accounting Matrix
The key data source for our study is the social accounting matrix taken from Kiringai, Thurlow and Wanjala (2006) . Given our focus on services, we found it necessary to disaggregate the single transportation sector into five sectors (based on value of output data of the various transportation sectors published in the Economic Survey, 2006 for Kenya by the Kenyan Central Bureau of Statistics) and the single financial services sector into insurance, and banking and other financial services, from data in the same source. A full listing of the sectors and factors of production is provided in table 1.
.
Trade Data by Regional Partner and Sector
To obtain the shares of imports and exports from the different regions of our model, we used trade data for 2007 obtained from WITS access to the COMTRADE database. The regions of our model are Kenya, the European Union, the East African Customs Union plus COMESA and the Rest of the World. In appendix A, we calculate and report data for the East African Customs Union and COMESA separately. We mapped two digit sectors from the COMTRADE database into the sectors of our model.
The exact mapping of sectors and countries and results for both exports and imports are reported in appendix A of Balistreri and Tarr (2011) .
Tariff Data
Tariff and Sales Tax Data. We started with MFN tariff rates at the eight digit level taken from the website of the Kenyan government: www.kra.go.ke/customs/customsdownloads.php. These tariff rates were then aggregated to the sectors of our model, using simple averages.
We obtained data on the total taxes on imports and the total value of imports and took the ratio to obtain the average value of import taxes in the Kenyan economy. In 2005, this was 8.4 percent.
14 That is, on average, Kenyan importers paid 8.4 percent of the value of imports on import taxes that did not apply to domestic production.
The MFN tariff rates, multiplied times the trade flows, exceed the collected tariff rates. That is, using MFN tariff rates for all trade, the weighted average tariff rate exceeds the collected tariff rate of 8.4
percent for the economy as a whole. Thus, they exaggerate the protection received by Kenyan industry and agriculture. This is due to tariff preferences to regional partners and due to other preference items or tariff exemptions. Since zero tariffs apply on all imports from the East African Customs Union and from COMESA, we apply the MFN tariff rates only on the trade flows from outside of these African regions (EU and Rest of World in our model) and take a weighted average tariff rate of the MFN rates on the nonEast African regions. The resulting weighted average tariff rate on non-East African imports still exceeds 8.4 percent. We then equi-proportionally reduced all the MFN tariffs in our model so that the estimated collected tariffs on imports from the EU and Rest of World divided by the total value of import is 8.4
percent.
Share of Market Captured by Multinational Service Providers
It was necessary to calculate the market share of multinational firms in the services sectors by region of the model. Take the banking sector as an example. We need to know the share of the market 14 Economic Survey (2006, pp. 103, 115 Balistreri and Tarr (2011) .
Share of Expatriate Labor Employed by Multinational Service Providers.
We obtained estimates of the share of expatriate labor or specialized technology not available to Kenyan firms that is used by multinational service providers in Kenya from the survey mentioned above.
We found that multinational service providers use mostly local primary factor inputs and only small amounts of expatriate labor or specialized technology. 15 Our estimated share of foreign inputs used by multinationals in Kenya is presented in table 4 on sensitivity analysis.
Estimates of the Dixit-Stiglitz Elasticities of Substitution for Goods
Christian 
VI. Results for Preferential Reduction of All Services Barriers-Central Elasticity Case
We execute several scenarios to assess the impacts of Kenya entering into a bilateral free trade agreement that includes services with the European Union, and similarly with the Africa region. In these scenarios we assume that Kenyan ad valorem equivalents of the barriers against foreign investors in services are reduced by fifty percent with respect to the region with which Kenya has an agreement. We assume that Kenya already offers tariff free access to goods originating from its African trade partners, so in the scenario where we evaluate the agreement with the Africa region we include only liberalization of discriminatory barriers against foreign investors in services. Insofar as combining preferential trade agreements could potentially reduce trade diversion inherent in separate agreements (see, e.g., Tarr, 2002, 2004) , we examine the impacts of the combination of free trade agreements with both the Africa region and the European Union. We compare these impacts with unilateral nondiscriminatory liberalization. Finally, given our earlier result on the importance of reducing nondiscriminatory barriers against investors in services, we examine the impact of a fifty percent reduction of non-discriminatory barriers against service providers combined with unilateral liberalization of discriminatory barriers.
As discussed in , who captures the rents from the barriers is very important for the welfare results. Consequently, for each policy scenario, we execute two versions of the model with our central elasticities. In one case, we assume that Kenyans do not capture any rents from the barriers. In the second scenario, we assume that the discriminatory barriers generate rents that are captured by Kenyans. These results are presented in table 3. In our systematic sensitivity analysis, in each of the 30,000 scenarios, we allow the share of rents captured by Kenyans to vary stochastically between zero and one.
Aggregate Effects 16
We present results on the impacts on aggregate variables including welfare, the real exchange rate, aggregate exports and imports, the return to capital, skilled labor and unskilled labor and the percentage change in tariff revenue. In order to obtain an estimate of the adjustment costs, we estimate the percentage of each of our factors of production that have to change industries.
Significant gains with the EU-deriving primarily from services liberalization. We estimate that the preferential arrangement with the EU that includes both goods and services would generate gains Why are the gains larger for the agreement with the "northern" region. As we discussed above, trade with and FDI from large technologically advanced regions can be expected to lead to technology diffusion that increases total factor productivity. Although trade and FDI from small developing countries can contribute to technology diffusion, it has been estimated to do so to a significantly lesser extent, at least for research and development intensive sectors. The elasticity of the number of varieties (firms) with respect to price is the parameter in our model that captures that effect, and the values we have chosen are in table 2. 17 In Balistreri and Tarr (2011) we show that the number of varieties from the EU substantially increases as a result of preferential liberalization with the EU, while the estimated expansion of varieties from the Africa region is much more modest in response to preferential liberalization with respect to the African region. We show in the sensitivity analysis below that this elasticity of supply parameter is very important for the results: preferential agreements in services are more likely to be beneficial the higher the supply elasticities of the partner country's services suppliers and the lower the supply elasticities of the excluded countries services suppliers.
Non-discriminatory liberalization would result in a five-fold increase in the gains compared
with preferential liberalization with the EU. With non-discriminatory liberalization, Kenyans would be able to access goods and services from the least cost supplier in the world. This would eliminate all trade diversion losses, reduce any adverse terms of trade losses and result in the maximum number of new 17 The elasticity of supply corresponds to the share of the sector's costs that are due to a specific factor of production. In all of the imperfectly competitive sectors, we assume there are four specific factors: one for each region in the model. Then, as industry output expands, the price of the specific factor necessary for production of that variety increases, thereby increasing the cost of production of firms. Since the cost of production of firms increases as the industry supply increases, the supply curve of each region will slope up in each of these sectors. And higher cost shares of the specific factor will lead to less elastic supply curves in that sector.
foreign varieties for productivity improvement from trade and FDI liberalization. Consequently, the gains are much larger in this case. Because the rest of the world has a much larger share of the goods market in Kenya than it enjoys in the services sectors, the gains from non-discriminatory liberalization come more from liberalization of goods than from services. 
VII. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we assess the impact of parameter values and key modeling assumptions on the results. In table 4, we show the -piecemeal sensitivity analysis,‖ where we change the value of a single parameter while holding the values of all other parameters unchanged at our central elasticity values. This table also shows the impact of some key modeling assumptions. We devote special attention to the role of the elasticity of firm supply.
Given uncertainty of parameter values and the rent capture assumption, point estimates of the results may be viewed with skepticism. In our -systematic sensitivity analysis,‖ we execute 30,000
simulations. In each simulation, we allow the computer to randomly select the values of all parameters, subject to the specified probability distributions of the parameters. Through the systematic sensitivity analysis we will be able to assess how robust the results are and obtain confidence intervals of the results.
Rent capture assumption-
In the row labeled θ r -share of rents captured‖ we retain the increasing returns to scale assumption in the services sectors and selected goods sectors, but allow the initial rent capture share in the services sectors to be either zero (central value ) or 1 (upper value). We see that there is approximately a forty percent reduction in the welfare gain from a free trade agreement with the EU if rents are captured initially (from a welfare gain of 0.67 percent of consumption to 0.49 percent of consumption). In the case of an agreement with the African region, the gains fall even more dramatically, from a welfare gain of 0.29 percent of consumption to a gain of 0.05 percent of consumption in our central elasticity case.
Impact of Constant Returns to Scale-Possible Negative Welfare Effects
In the row labeled CRTS-share of rents captured, we assume constant returns to scale in all sectors, which eliminates the Dixit-Stiglitz externality from additional varieties. We allow the initial rent capture share in the services sectors to be either zero (central value) or 1 (upper value). We see that without the Dixit-Stiglitz variety externality, the gains from an agreement with the EU fall dramatically.
With no initial rent capture, the gains for the EU agreement would be .09 percent of consumption, and would fall to negative values (-0.06 percent of consumption) with initial rent capture. In the case of an agreement with the Africa region, the gains are 0.14 percent of consumption with no initial rent capture and are negative (-0.06 percent of consumption) with initial rent capture.
Piecemeal Sensitivity Analysis of Parameters
Four parameters stand out as having a strong impact on the results. The elasticity of substitution between firm varieties in imperfectly competitive services sectors, σ(q i , q j ) has a very strong impact. At the low end of the elasticity range, the estimated gains are almost 10 per cent of consumption from a preferential agreement with the EU and five percent of consumption from an agreement with the Africa region. Following from the Le Chatelier principle, larger elasticities typically lead to larger welfare gains in response to welfare improving reforms, as the economy can adapt more readily. Unlike other elasticities, however, a lower value of σ(q i ,q j ) increases the welfare gains. This is because lower values of this elasticity imply that varieties are less close to each other, so additional varieties are worth more.
Since the policy shocks in goods are much less, the same elasticity variation in goods has a much smaller impact, but its impact is nonetheless significant. The elasticity of substitution between value-added and business services, σ(va, bs), also has a strong impact. The better firms are able to substitute business services for labor and capital, the more the economy will gain from the reforms that reduce the quality adjusted price of business services. Finally, for the agreement with the EU, there is a strong impact from changes in the value of ε EU , the elasticity of multinational service firm supply with respect to the price of output. For the agreement with Africa, there is a strong impact of the parameter ε AFR . Larger values of this parameter mean that tariff preferences that open opportunities for EU service firms to provide new varieties, will not be so quickly choked by the increased cost of the specific factor required for EU firm expansion. We now investigate the sensitivity of the results to changes in the value of this parameter in more detail below.
Impact of Partner and Excluded Country Elasticities of Multinational Service Firm Supply-why it is more likely to obtain gains from large technologically advanced partners
In figures 1 and 2, we depict the impact and interrelationship of the elasticities of firm supply from partner and excluded countries. In figure 1 , we examine the estimates for the welfare effects in Regarding preferential reduction of barriers with African partners, we see that, with initial rent capture, there is a significant range of elasticities that result in losses for Kenya. Without initial rent capture, however, there are gains for all these values.
We see from figures 1 and 2 that the gains to the home country increase the higher the elasticity of supply of firms in partner countries and the lower the elasticity of supply of firms in excluded countries, with the partner country elasticity being by far the more important. Preferential reduction of barriers, leads to an increase in firms (varieties) and productivity from partner countries; but it also leads to a loss of service providers (varieties) from all excluded regions and the home country, which results in a loss of productivity. The lost productivity from lost varieties from the regions excluded and the home country from the preferential liberalization in services is analogous to the trade diversion losses in perfect competition. When firm elasticities in partner countries are high, the after tax price increase for firms in partner countries from preferential reduction of barriers induces a large increase in partner country varieties, boosting productivity, thereby making it more likely that the preferential liberalization is welfare enhancing. For excluded countries, the price decrease of partner countries shifts in demand for their products and lowers their price; but the lower price induces fewer lost varieties when firms in excluded countries have low elasticities (the excluded country impact is more significant in figure 2 ). In addition to the variety impacts in imperfect competition, the rent and terms of trade impacts (which are present in perfect competition) reinforce the argument that high elasticities of partners and low elasticities of excluded countries increase the likelihood of welfare gains from a preferential agreement in services.
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis
In the systematic sensitivity analysis, we execute the model 30,000 times and harvest the results for desired variables. In each individual simulation, we allow the computer to select values of all the parameters in the model (the parameters in table 4), based on the specified probability density functions (pdfs) of the parameters. We assume uniform probability density functions, with upper and lower values of the pdfs given by the upper and lower values in the piecemeal sensitivity analysis table. We include initial rent capture in the systematic sensitivity analysis, with the rent capture parameter allowed to take values between zero and one with a uniform pdf.
The sample distributions of the results for preferential reduction of barriers with African partners on welfare and output, respectively, are shown in figures 3 and 4, and similar figures for the preferential trade agreement with the EU in figures 5 and 6. For the Africa-Kenya FTA, we find that 1.9 percent of the 30,000 simulations yield a negative welfare result, which we interpret as a 1.9 percent probability that preferential liberalization with the Africa region will be immizerizing. A 95 percent confidence interval for equivalent variation as a percent of consumption is: 0.008 to 0.417 around a sample mean of .203.
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For a free trade agreement with the EU that includes services, there are no negative welfare results. A 95 percent confidence interval for equivalent variation as a percent of consumption is: 0.37 to 0.94 around a sample mean of 0.63.
19
To further establish the relative importance of technology transfer in the choice of partners in preferential trade arrangements, we executed a second systematic sensitivity analysis of 30,000 runs. In this alternative systematic sensitivity analysis, we choose uniform pdfs for ε AFR , ε EU and ε ROW with lower and upper bounds for ε AFR of 1 and 3, for ε EU of 5 and 15 and for ε ROW of 7.5 and 22.5. All other probability distributions for all other parameters are unchanged, i.e., are as in table 4. Our median estimate for the gains from a preferential agreement with the Africa region falls, and the chance of the agreement yielding negative values increases to 9.5 percent. Figures 1 and 2 suggest that the key change in this alternate systematic sensitivity analysis is the lower pdf for ε AFR .
In figures 4 and 7, we show -box and whisker‖ diagrams for the sample distribution of the 50 percent confidence intervals indicate the sectors will expand; but 95 percent confidence intervals contain negative values. We conclude the predicted output changes for these sectors are not robust.
VIII. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed an innovative small open economy computable general equilibrium model of the Kenyan economy that is capable of assessing the impact of the preferential liberalization of barriers against multinational service providers. We show that under imperfect competition with the Dixit-Stiglitz variety externality, welfare losses from preferential reduction of services barriers are possible due to a loss of varieties from excluded countries. We have conducted extensive sensitivity analysis and find that mean estimate of the gains to Kenya from preferential reduction of barriers in services with the Africa region is very small, and there is a 1.9 percent chance that it would lose from such an agreement. Estimated gains for the agreement with the European Union are two to three times larger and occur with probability one. Both piecemeal and further systematic sensitivity analysis show that the estimated gains for the agreement with the Africa region are smaller because Africa is less technologically advanced than the European Union--trade and FDI with the technologically advanced EU region leads to greater endogenous productivity gains. We also show that losses from a preferential agreement are more likely and the greater the rent capture on initial barriers in services. We estimate that multilateral liberalization dominates preferential liberalization, as it would yield gains five times greater than a preferential agreement with the European Union; but the largest estimated gains derive from removal of non-discriminatory regulatory barriers that impose costs on Kenyan as well as multinational service providers. Note: The boxes are limited vertically by the 25% and 75% quartiles. The bars in the box are the means. The vertical lines extend to the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles.
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